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Herding Dynamics in Exchange Groups: Evidence from Euronext 
 We examine whether joining an exchange group confers an effect over herding in the group’s 
member-markets and if this effect persists when accounting for various domestic and 
international market states, the dynamics of the group’s member-markets and the outbreak of 
financial crises 
 We test for the above in the context of the Euronext, which contains four equity markets 
(Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal) 
 Herding is significant post-merger in all four markets; herding in Portugal is significant (yet 
less strong) pre-merger as well. These results are robust when controlling for various 
domestic/international market states and the dynamics of the group’s markets 
 Herding following the outbreak of the euro-zone crisis is significant in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Portugal, and is motivated by the dynamics of the group’s two largest 
markets (France and the Netherlands). 
*Highlights (for review)
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Herding Dynamics in Exchange Groups: Evidence from Euronext 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates in the context of the Euronext, whether joining an exchange group affects 
herding in the group‟s member-markets and if this effect persists when accounting for various 
domestic and international market states, the dynamics of the group‟s member-markets and the 
outbreak of financial crises. We find that herding is significant post-merger in all four constituent 
equity markets (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal) of the Euronext, with herding in 
Portugal being significant (yet less strong) pre-merger as well. These results are robust when 
controlling for various domestic and international market states, as well as the dynamics of the 
group‟s markets. The period following the outbreak of the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis produces 
significant herding in Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, with this herding being motivated by 
the dynamics of the group‟s two largest markets (France and the Netherlands). 
 
JEL classification: G12, G15, G31 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade, financial integration has prompted considerable cross-border co-operation among 
stock exchanges worldwide. Perhaps the most visible form of such co-operation is the forging of 
regional and global exchange groups, whereby the member-markets of any group share a common 
institutional framework in their regulatory design and a uniform trading protocol based on a single 
trading platform. Although this development has given rise to new trading dynamics by facilitating 
cross-market trading within each group (investors from any member-market can trade more easily in 
the group‟s other member-markets), the implications of this on investors‟ behaviour have been largely 
overlooked. In this study we primarily focus on the behavioural pattern of herding which has often 
been documented in investors‟ trades globally and has been found to impact on securities‟ returns1. 
An interesting issue arising in this context is whether membership in an exchange group produces an 
effect over investors‟ herding in the group‟s member-markets. A second issue is whether this effect 
persists when controlling for various domestic and international market conditions for each member-
exchange, given the extant evidence in the literature suggesting the sensitivity of herding to different 
domestic/international market states (Chang et al., 2000; Holmes et al., 2013; Gavriilidis et al., 2013). 
A third issue arising is whether our results are robust when controlling for the effect of the dynamics 
of the rest of the group‟s markets over each member-market‟s herding, in view of research suggesting 
that herding in a market can be affected by other markets‟ dynamics (Chiang and Zheng, 2010; 
Balcilar et al., 2013). A fourth issue we examine is whether herding is significant following the 
outbreak of the recent sovereign debt crisis in the euro-zone, more so in view of research (Choe et al., 
1999; Hwang and Salmon, 2004) denoting the role of crises as turning points in herding 
internationally. It is these four research questions this paper is addressing.  
From a theoretical perspective, herding refers to individuals choosing to mimic the behaviour of 
others following observation of each other‟s actions and actions-payoffs (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). 
Depending on the motives underlying imitation, herding can be classified into intentional and 
unintentional/spurious (Holmes et al., 2013; Gavriilidis et al., 2013). Intentional herding is reflected 
in correlated actions motivated through the anticipation of (mainly information- or career-related) 
                                                          
1 See the excellent survey study by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). 
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payoffs in settings characterized by actual or perceived asymmetry. If an investor considers himself to 
be informationally disadvantaged relative to other investors due to the bad quality of his information 
or his inadequate information-processing skills, he has every reason to try to narrow the informational 
gap by copying the actions of those he considers better informed (Devenow and Welch, 1996). In the 
extreme, if the tendency to follow others instead of focusing on their own private signals becomes 
widespread among investors, this will give rise to cascades (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 
1992), leading the public pool of information to grow poorer. Career reasons can also motivate 
herding intent, something particularly relevant to finance professionals, such as fund managers. With 
fund managers‟ performance in the finance sector being assessed relative to their peers‟ (or the 
industry-average), bad-quality managers are tempted to mimic the trades of good-quality ones to 
improve their image and protect their career prospects (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). Correlated 
actions can also emanate from commonalities in the background and trading conduct of market 
participants, thus leading to unintentional herding. Finance professionals, for example, can herd due 
to relative homogeneity (De Bondt and Teh, 1997) in their background (in terms of their education, 
the information they receive and its processing; Wermers, 1999) and the regulatory framework they 
are subject to (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005). Characteristic trading
2
 also increases the correlation of 
investors‟ trades, thus generating a false impression of them imitating each other without imitation 
actually being present (their common strategy inevitably leads them to trade similar stocks). 
From an empirical perspective, the presence of market herding has been tested internationally in both 
developed and emerging stock exchanges and for periods of various characteristics with overall 
evidence being mixed
3
. Christie and Huang (1995) report the absence of herding in the US during 
periods of extreme market returns, both at the aggregate market level and for different sectors. Chang 
et al. (2000) find significant herding only for the emerging markets of their sample after controlling 
for market movement, size effects, daily price limits and market liberalization, while Hwang and 
                                                          
2 Characteristic trading refers to strategies (e.g. momentum, value, etc., also known as “styles”) basing stock-selection on 
particular characteristics (e.g. past performance, size, etc.) and is frequently employed by funds (Sias, 2004). 
3 Studies using transaction data also find mixed evidence on herding. Early studies (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Grinblatt et al., 
1995; Wermers, 1999) found limited evidence of herding among US funds while subsequent studies reported significant 
institutional herding in the US at the aggregate (Sias, 2004) and sector (Choi and Sias, 2009) levels. Significant herding has 
been detected among institutional investors in Germany (Kremer and Nautz, 2013), Portugal (Holmes et al., 2013) and Spain 
(Gavriilidis et al., 2013), yet not to that extent in Poland (Goodfellow et al., 2009) and the UK (Wylie, 2005). 
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Salmon (2004) report significant herding for the US and South Korean markets irrespective of market 
conditions and fundamental indicators. Caparelli et al. (2004) document mixed evidence for herding 
in the Italian market, while Gleason et al. (2004) document no evidence of intraday herding among 
US exchange-traded funds. Demirer and Kutan (2006) find no evidence of herding in the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock markets both at the aggregate market and the sector levels after controlling for 
extreme market returns, the Asian financial crisis and several regulatory changes; conversely, Tan et 
al. (2008) and Chiang et al. (2010) document the presence of significant herding for both A- and B-
shares in Chinese markets
4
. Regarding the euro-zone‟s south European markets (Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain), Economou et al. (2011) find evidence of significant herding within and across 
all of them after controlling for periods of positive/negative market performance, high/low 
volatility/trading volume and the global financial crisis. Using an international sample of eighteen 
markets, Chiang and Zheng (2010) document strong evidence of herding in most of their sample 
markets (with the exception of Latin America and the US); their results suggest that herding is strong 
primarily during up-markets in Asian countries and that investors herd significantly towards the US 
market, aside from their domestic markets. Blasco et al. (2012) find that intraday herding rises with 
volatility in the Spanish market, while, Gebka and Wohar (2013) find limited evidence of herding at 
the aggregate market and sector levels across thirty-two markets. 
Despite the above wealth of research on herding, very little attention has been devoted to its presence 
in the context of exchange groups, which are products of the global financial integration process 
underway during the past two decades. The liberalization of international portfolio flows and the 
proliferation of cross-listings in the 1990s changed the landscape for stock exchanges, which 
thereafter started vying internationally for more listings and higher volumes of trade in order to ensure 
their liquidity and profitability. To enable themselves to compete under these conditions, several 
exchanges opted for more flexible governance structures – demutualization (Aggarwal and Dahiya, 
                                                          
4 Tan et al. (2008) find that B-shares‟ investors herd significantly during up/down market days, high/low volume days and 
high volatility days; A-shares‟ herding is found to be significant during up/down market days, high volume days and high 
volatility days. Chiang et al. (2010) report widespread herding among A-shares during up/down markets, with less herding 
being reported for B-shares.   
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2006)
5
. The profit-seeking incentives of demutualized exchanges prompted them to commit more 
resources to advanced technologies and financial innovation in order to handle the increasing volumes 
of trade and attract more cross-listings (Nielsson, 2009). With the costs of these investments rising, 
many markets entered cross-border alliances with other exchanges in the pursuit of synergies (Hasan 
and Schmiedel, 2004), thus gradually giving rise to regional and global exchange groups
6
 
characterized by uniform regulatory frameworks and trading systems. 
We now turn to discuss the possible effects of a market‟s merger into an exchange group over that 
market‟s herding; the salient point here is whether the merger leads herding-related factors to grow 
more (in which case, the incentive to herd should increase) or less (in which case, herding would be 
expected to decrease) important. Exchange groups operate common trading platforms whose 
technological sophistication enhances transparency, promotes ease of trading across the group‟s 
member markets (Andrikopoulos et al., 2014), leads to reduced transaction costs (Pagano and Padilla, 
2005) and can allow for higher volumes/frequencies of trading (Hagströmer and Nordén, 2013), thus 
leading to higher liquidity (Nielsson, 2009). These features are notably appealing, in particular, to 
foreign institutional investors
7
 and if a market‟s merger into a group with such highly sophisticated 
structures leads to a rise in the participation of this investor-type in its trading activity
8
, this will, in 
turn, increase its investors-heterogeneity, and improve the quality of its public information-pool
9
. 
Under these conditions, it is reasonable to expect that the significance of herding will decline, as 
investors will be able to rely more on publicly available information (thus feeling less informationally 
disadvantaged) and any herding tendencies can quickly be arbitraged away by informed investors.  
However, it is possible that the merger of a market into a group may actually amplify herding 
tendencies. A possibility here is that a group‟s greater transparency can facilitate observation among 
                                                          
5 Namely the transformation of exchanges from mutual ownership structures to for-profit corporations. Under mutual 
ownership structures, trading and ownership are inseparable i.e. brokers command shares of the exchange and voting rights. 
Demutualized exchanges are limited liability companies, whose owners are not necessarily involved in their trading process.  
6 Examples of regional exchange groups include the Euronext and OMX in Europe and the BRVM in Western Africa; 
NYSE-Euronext and NASDAQ-OMX are examples of global exchange groups. 
7 Institutional investors internationally are increasingly relying on automated trading systems (“algorithms”; see Hasbrouck 
and Saar, 2013), which can allow them substantial trading firepower in settings characterized by advanced financial 
technology (like those of an exchange group).  
8 Foreign investors have been found (Gelos and Wei, 2005) to be attracted to markets typified by greater transparency. 
Transparency aside, diversification is another factor that can encourage foreign funds to enter a market that has just merged 
into an exchange group (this is the case, for example, of those funds whose investment scope targets the specific group). 
9 This is because foreign institutional investors are normally regarded as informed, sophisticated traders (Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2000; Froot and Ramadorai, 2008). 
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investors, leading the uninformed to track the trades of the informed ones (Holmes et al., 2013); less 
skilled or less experienced local fund managers in that market, for example, may begin tracking the 
trades of newly attracted overseas funds in an effort to improve their professional prospects
10
. The 
feasibility of herding in this case would be further boosted in view of the anticipated lower transaction 
costs in a group‟s context. Moreover, contingent upon the incentives driving their decision-making, 
institutional investors can also lead herding in a market to be affected by the dynamics of the group‟s 
other markets. If managers, for example, are risk-averse and at the same time treat the group as a 
single market in their portfolio, then a negative announcement regarding one of the group‟s markets 
can lead them to reduce their exposure to the group as a whole since they might anticipate the 
announcement to cast a negative effect over other member-markets of the group.
11
 Similarly, if 
managers invest in only one of the group‟s markets (market A) and their information about that 
market is imperfect, then a negative announcement regarding another member-market of that group 
(market B) can prompt them to reduce their exposure to market A, if they consider signals from the 
group‟s other member-markets to be informative for their decisions regarding market A.12    
The above discussion denotes that the effect of exchange group membership over a market‟s herding 
constitutes a controversial issue, as it is not possible to predict on theoretical grounds whether herding 
will grow stronger or weaker following a market‟s merger in an exchange group. Our paper aims at 
investigating this issue empirically in the context of the Euronext, one of the first-ever cross-border 
exchange-groups established, which is comprised of the equity markets of Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands and Portugal.  
We then examine how herding varies in each Euronext-market pre- versus post-merger with various 
domestic and international market conditions; the latter include (as we shall discuss in more detail in 
section 3) the daily (up and down) movement of each market‟s average return and trading volume, the 
return of the CAC40 (the blue chip index of France, Euronext‟s lead market), the return of the 
                                                          
10 According to Menkhoff et al. (2006) less experienced fund managers are more likely to herd. Moreover, even though, 
local fund managers are expected to have more correlated investment behavior (e.g. due to shared local information and 
informal communication, social interaction, performance-based appraisal with their domestic peers etc.), local fund 
managers can also be tempted to observe and imitate their cross-border peers (Parwada and Yang, 2009).   
11 A manager whose investments cover a whole group may behave like this due to information costs – the larger the number 
of markets in a group, the higher the cost of obtaining information for each.  
12 Such behaviour may be rational if acquiring information regarding market A comes at a high cost.  
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S&P500 and the US VIX values. Controlling for the effect of domestic and international market states 
over herding in the context of this study serves three purposes. First of all, it allows us to gauge the 
robustness of the merger‟s effect over herding in each market, in view of the wide evidence in the 
literature denoting that herding is affected by changes in market conditions
13
. More specifically, if 
herding exhibits a distinct pre-versus-post-Euronext pattern (e.g. appears consistently significant 
before and insignificant after the Euronext-merger or vice versa) in a market irrespective of 
domestic/international market states, this would suggest an effect of the merger over herding; 
conversely, if herding pre-/post-Euronext varies in its significance with domestic/international market 
states, this would indicate the absence of a robust merger-effect. Secondly, in view of exchange 
groups‟ role as vehicles of international financial integration, controlling for both domestic and 
international market conditions allows us to assess whether joining a group affects herding-sensitivity 
to non-domestic factors. Finally, the relative magnitude of herding between market states (e.g. up 
versus down markets) can offer us the opportunity to generate inferences regarding the possible 
motives underlying herding.  
We also explore whether controlling for the dynamics of the rest of Euronext‟s markets confers an 
effect over each member-market‟s herding before and after its merger in the group. This is primarily 
undertaken here as an additional robustness test of the merger‟s effect over herding prior to versus 
after the formation of the Euronext, while also allowing us to assess whether there exist specific 
patterns (for example, whether the dynamics of the group‟s larger markets affect herding in the 
group‟s smaller markets).  
Finally, we also analyse whether herding is significant following the outbreak of the European 
sovereign debt crisis. The literature on herding during crisis-episodes is rather extensive, with several 
studies suggesting that financial crises constitute turning points for herding. However, the evidence on 
this issue is mixed, with some studies (Kim and Wei, 2002; Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Mobarek et al., 
                                                          
13 The importance of changes in market conditions in understanding herding was analyzed by Holmes et al. (2013), who 
showed how the propensity of institutional investors to herd varied with different levels of market returns/volatility as well 
as regulatory changes. What is more, Gavriilidis et al. (2013) demonstrated that, aside from market states, industry-specific 
conditions are also relevant to institutional herding. Evidence from herding research at the market-level (Chang et al., 2000; 
Caparelli et al., 2004; Demirer and Kutan, 2006; Tan et al., 2008; Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Chiang et al., 2010; Economou 
et al., 2011) has also indicated that the significance of herding can vary in relation to different states of a market‟s returns, 
volatility and volume. 
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2014) finding that herding is boosted following a crisis‟ outbreak, while others (Choe et al., 1999; 
Hwang and Salmon, 2004) showing that herding is greatly reduced following the outbreak. With 
respect to our work, studying herding within an exchange group during a crisis allows us novel insight 
into trading dynamics, in particular intra-group ones (i.e. those referring to the effect of each member-
market‟s trading dynamics upon herding in the group‟s other markets), which have never been 
investigated before in the literature, despite the proliferation of exchange groups – and crises - during 
the past decade. 
Our results show that Belgium, France and the Netherlands are characterized by significant herding 
only in the aftermath of their merger into the Euronext, with herding in Portugal appearing significant 
both pre- and post-merger. These results are relatively robust when controlling for the effect of 
various domestic and international market states as well as for the dynamics of the group‟s other 
member-markets. A very interesting observation is that these dynamics give rise themselves to 
significant herding in all four markets post-merger, thus leading each market to present itself with 
evidence of herding motivated by both its domestic and the group‟s dynamics following its merger in 
the group. The outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis brings about significant herding in three 
of the group‟s markets (with the exception of France); however, in this case, any evidence of herding 
is exclusively motivated by the dynamics of the group‟s two largest markets (France; Netherlands).  
Our study contributes to the herding literature
14
 by providing novel insights into the effect of 
exchange group membership over herding dynamics. Key to our results is the finding that intra-group 
dynamics constitute (alongside each market‟s domestic dynamics) significant determinants of herding 
                                                          
14 Andrikopoulos et al. (2014) tested whether herding grows more or less significant for the same four markets following 
their merger into the Euronext and whether controlling for various domestic conditions conferred an effect over their results. 
Our study differs from theirs in several ways: 
a) their study tested for herding using the model of Hwang and Salmon (2004) which extracts herding from the cross-
sectional dispersion of monthly equity betas; in other words, herding is estimated in this framework at the monthly 
frequency. Conversely, we test for herding using the Chang et al. (2000) approach which entails two distinct advantages 
compared to Hwang and Salmon (2004). On the one hand, it allows us to examine herding at the daily frequency (as opposed 
to the monthly one of Hwang and Salmon, 2004), thus allowing us to capture short-term herding dynamics, something 
particularly important, given that herding normally occurs at short horizons (Froot et al., 1992). On the other hand, by 
employing returns and their dispersions, it bypasses the issue of potential biases in herding estimations in the Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) framework due to beta-estimation biases which have been extensively documented in the literature (see e.g. 
Brooks et al., 2005). 
b) we test for the effect of international, as well as domestic, market conditions over herding pre- versus post-merger, 
whereas their work focuses exclusively on the effect of domestic variables. 
c) our study tests for the impact of the dynamics of the group‟s markets over each member-market‟s herding, which their 
paper does not.   
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in Euronext‟s member-markets, suggesting that researchers should take into account the presence of 
these dynamics when examining herding in cross-border exchange groups. The fact that intra-group 
dynamics alone are found to promote herding following the outbreak of the euro-zone sovereign debt 
crisis is in itself very interesting, as it denotes the role of these dynamics in a group‟s setting during 
international crisis-episodes for the first time in the literature. These results are of particular relevance 
to regulators and policymakers alike, given the ongoing consolidating activity among stock markets 
internationally, the higher frequency of international crisis-outbreaks during the past few decades and 
the relation of herding to systemic risk within, and contagion across, capital markets (Dornbusch et 
al., 2000). The evidence presented is also of interest to investors, particularly portfolio managers with 
a global investment outlook, as it raises questions on whether investing in markets belonging to the 
same cross-border exchange group is beneficial in terms of portfolio diversification
15
, more so in view 
of the negative impact of herding itself over diversification (Chang et al., 2000). The next section 
presents an overview of the Euronext; section 3 presents the data and methodology employed 
alongside some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents and discusses the results and section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. The Euronext  
The birth of the Euronext can be traced back to March 2000, when the merger of the Amsterdam, 
Brussels and Paris stock exchanges was announced with the merger of their equity, derivatives and 
clearing segments coming into effect from September 22
nd
 of that year. The group expanded shortly 
thereafter when the LIFFE (London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange) and the 
Lisbon exchange joined it in 2002,
16
 while 2007 saw it merging with the New York Stock Exchange 
to create the first intercontinental exchange in history. With its share in Euronext‟s total equity 
                                                          
15 Recently, Hellström et al. (2013) identified increased long-run trends in return correlations after the creation of the 
uniform OMX trading platform among the all-share indices of four OMX-members (Denmark; Finland; Iceland; Sweden).  
16 Portuguese stocks were first included in Euronext indices in April 2002. 
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turnover and capitalization hovering around 65 percent, France clearly emerges as the group‟s 
dominant market, followed by the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal
17
. 
Trading in the Euronext is based on a common platform modelled after the French Nouvelle Système 
de Cotation (NSC) – a hybrid system with a limit-order book emphasis. The harmonization of the four 
constituent equity markets (Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon and Paris) with that system came about 
rather easily, since all four of them shared rather similar trading systems (order-driven, electronic 
system for continuous trading with market-makers assigned to illiquid stocks) prior to their merger 
into the group (Nielsson, 2009). Stock trading on Euronext is continuous with a double-auction in 
place and lasts from 09:00 to 17:25 Central European Time. The first auction (“start-of-day”) takes 
place before continuous trading commences and leads to opening prices being set while the second 
auction (“end-of-day”) takes place at day-close between 17:25 and 17:30 followed by a 10-minute 
window of trading to allow traders to transact at the “end-of-day” auction‟s prices (Beltran et al., 
2004). The system allows the placement of traditional (limit/market) and more sophisticated (fill-or-
kill
18
; must-be-filled
19
; iceberg
20
) orders. Block trading is allowed for large-volume orders within 
price-limits set by the market (Beltran et al., 2004). Details on all orders/trades are available to traders 
pre- and post-trade, with trader-anonymity being ensured (Andrikopoulos et al., 2014). 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
From a methodological perspective, the first attempt at estimating herding at the market level was that 
by Christie and Huang (1995) who used to that end the cross-sectional standard deviation of returns, 
formally calculated as: 
1
1
2
)( ,,


 

n
CSSD
n
i
t
rr tmti
                                                                                                                (1)  
                                                          
17 The figures reported in Andrikopoulos et al. (2014) indicate the following average percentage shares in the Euronext‟s 
total equity turnover (capitalization) for the 2003-2008 window: Belgium 4% (10%); France 64% (66%); the Netherlands 
30% (22%) and Portugal 2% (3%).   
18 These are limit orders that are either to be fully executed or cancelled. 
19 These are market orders whose execution must take place irrespective of the price.  
20 They are “hidden” limit orders whose total size is not displayed in the order book but is split into equal-sized tranches 
where the execution of each tranche is conditional upon the execution of the previous one.  
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Here ri,t is security i’s return on day t, rm,t is the market‟s average return on day t (calculated by 
averaging the returns of all securities for day t) and n is the total number of listed stocks on day t. 
Next, herding is estimated using the following linear regression model:  
CSSDt = α0 + α1 Dt
U
 + α2 Dt
L 
+ εt                                                                                                          (2) 
Dt
U
 (Dt
L
) equals one if the market return lies in the extreme upper (lower) tail of the market return 
distribution, otherwise it is zero. Rational asset pricing models (Black, 1972) predict that the 
dispersion of returns is an increasing function of the market‟s absolute return, given each stock‟s 
different sensitivity to market movements. This would suggest that extreme periods, which 
accommodate returns of high absolute value, should witness an increase in the values of CSSD; if, 
however, extreme periods are characterized by herding, securities‟ returns would be expected to 
cluster tightly around the market-average (a proxy for the market‟s consensus), thus leading to a 
reduction in the values of CSSD. As a result, herding would be reflected in equation (2) through 
significantly negative values of α1 and/or α2, as this would denote that CSSD decreases during 
extreme market periods.   
The above model contained a few drawbacks, the first one being that the CSSD is susceptible to the 
impact of outliers (Economou et al., 2011). The second one relates to the fact that in the presence of 
herding during extreme periods the linearly positive relationship between returns‟ dispersion and 
market returns does not hold, becoming non-linear instead. To address these issues, Chang et al. 
(2000) proposed a modified approach over the Christie and Huang (1995) one which is based on the 
detection of herding through the relationship of the market returns and the cross-sectional absolute 
deviation (CSAD) of returns, formally calculated as: 



N
i
tmtit
rr
n
CSAD
1
,,
1
 
                                                                                                                 (3) 
The notation is the same as for equation (1) above. Chang et al. (2000) estimated herding utilizing the 
following specification: 
CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r
2
m,t + εt                                                                                                                 (4) 
Controlling for market returns (through |rm,t|, in order to capture the linear part of the relationship 
between CSAD and market returns), equation (4) accounts for the non-linear part of this relationship 
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through the inclusion of the squared market return; in view of the above, herding is identified through 
significantly negative values for the α2 coefficient. For the purposes of this study, we assess the effect 
of the merger into the Euronext on herding using the following specification of equation (4): 
CSADm,t = α0 + α1D
Euronext
|rm,t| + α2(1-D
Euronext
)|rm,t| + α3D
Euronext
r
2
m,t + α4(1-D
Euronext
) r
2
m,t + εt                      (5) 
Equation (5) is a modified version of equation (4) and is used to assess the presence of herding in each 
of the four markets before and after its merger into the Euronext for the December 31
st
, 1989 – 
October 31
st
, 2009 period (in order to avoid including the European sovereign debt crisis period that 
ensued after October 2009)
21
. Significantly negative values of α3 (α4) would indicate the presence of 
herding following (before) the merger of that market into the Euronext. The Euronext-dummy 
(D
Euronext
)
 
equals one from October 2000 onwards for Belgium, France and the Netherlands (April 
2002 onwards for Portugal) and zero before that.   
To assess the robustness of the results to various domestic and international market states, we 
parameterize equation (5) on the directional movement (up and down) of the following variables
22
: 
a) Domestic average market return. This is the rm,t used in the calculation of CSAD for each 
market and is utilized here to gauge whether herding significance is a function of a market‟s 
performance. Down-markets can be conducive to herding as they prompt market participants to 
unload their positions in order to avoid suffering further losses in case the downturn becomes 
prolonged; this is particularly the case with institutional investors, given the adverse effect that 
losses can bear over their p riodic performance evaluation
23
. On the other hand, up-markets can 
also boost herding, since they can lead investors to ride on what they believe to be an upward 
trend (De Long et al., 1990). Empirical research on the link between herding and market 
performance is rather extensive, yet characterized by mixed evidence to date
24
.   
                                                          
21
 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out in an earlier version of this paper.  
22 The conditioning of equation (5) upon the different states of variables a) – e) mentioned here follows Chang et al. (2000) 
(e.g. they estimate herding for up-market days as CSADUPm,t = α
UP
0 + α
UP
1|rm,t| + α
UP
2r
2
m,t + εt by utitlizing only trading days 
with positive market returns). 
23 Lesser-quality fund managers would have an obvious incentive to mimic their better-able counterparts during down-
market periods, since they could ascribe their losses to the overall adverse market conditions, despite them having made the 
“right” investment decisions (i.e. those they copied from their “good” peers). For more on this, see Holmes et al. (2013). 
24 Chen (2013), Philippas et al. (2013) and Mobarek et al. (2014) reported significant herding during market slumps. Chiang 
et al. (2010) found significant herding in both up- and down- markets for Chinese A-shares; conversely, herding was 
significant only in downside markets for B-shares. Tan et al. (2008) reported stronger herding during up- markets in 
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b) Domestic market trading volume. It is calculated for each market as the sum of the daily 
volumes of all listed stocks in that market. Rising volumes tend to attract more informed investors 
(they allow them to trade on their information) and make it easier for uninformed investors to 
mimic them (high liquidity implies less frictions in trading, thus rendering it easier for investors to 
herd if they choose to do so; Gavriilidis et al., 2013). On the other hand, low volume can also 
promote herding, since it prompts investors to focus their trades on those stocks with sufficient 
volume, essentially leading to a clustering of trading activity. Again here, the role of volume in 
herding has been denoted by several studies, with the evidence produced being mixed
25
.  
c) CAC40. France‟s blue chip index comprised of the forty largest stocks listed on the Paris market. 
With France being Euronext‟s largest market, we use it as a control variable to test whether the 
group‟s lead market affects herding in the group‟s other markets. 
d) S&P500. The US main market index, comprised of the 500 largest stocks listed on the US 
market. We use the S&P500 here as a control variable to test whether the world‟s largest market 
affects herding dynamics in our estimations, more so in view of evidence (Chiang and Zheng, 
2010) indicating that US market conditions prompt investors‟ herding worldwide. 
e) CBOE VIX. A proxy of US investors‟ sentiment, calculated as an implied volatility index based 
on S&P500 options, expressing the next 30 calendar days expected future market volatility. The 
CBOE VIX index was introduced in 1993 and is widely considered to be the “investors' fear 
gauge” (Whaley, 2000). As a result, higher VIX levels indicate higher uncertainty and fear in the 
market. The US sentiment is a factor affecting international markets (Verma and Soydemir, 
2006), with evidence (Chiang et al., 2013; Philippas et al., 2013) suggesting the presence of a 
significant relationship between herding and the VIX-index internationally. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Shanghai A-shares, with no such asymmetry surfacing in the Shenzhen market (or the B-shares‟ segment of Shanghai 
thereof). From the perspective of institutional investors, Holmes et al. (2013) and Gavriilidis et al. (2013) documented 
significant herding among Portuguese and Spanish funds respectively, during periods of negative market/sector returns.  
25 Tan et al. (2008) report significant herd behavior for A-share markets in China during high-volume days, while B-shares‟ 
investors herd significantly during both high- and low- volume days. Moreover, Economou et al. (2011) provide evidence of 
an asymmetric volume effect for the Spanish and the Portuguese markets with herding being higher there during high trading 
volume days, while no such asymmetry is reported for the Greek and the Italian stock markets. Gavriilidis et al. (2013) found 
that Spanish fund managers tended to herd more at the industry level during periods characterized by rising/high 
market/sector volume.   
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It is also possible that the significance of herding in an exchange group‟s member-market is affected 
by the dynamics in the group‟s other markets. To account for this possibility, we modify equation (4) 
as follows:  
CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r
2
m,t + α3r
2
n,t + α4CSADn,t + εt                                                                      (6) 
In equation (6), the cross-sectional absolute deviation and the squared return of market n (n≠m) are 
included as independent variables, in line with Balcilar et al. (2013), Lee et al. (2013) and Chiang and 
Zheng (2010); to assess whether the effect from other member-markets‟ dynamics changes pre- versus 
post-merger into the Euronext, we modify equation (5) as follows: 
CSADm,t = α0 + α1D
Euronext
|rm,t| + α2(1-D
Euronext
)|rm,t| + α3D
Euronext
r
2
m,t + α4(1-D
Euronext
) r
2
m,t + α5D
Euronext
r
2
n,t 
+ α6(1-D
Euronext
) r
2
n,t + α7D
Euronext
|CSADn,t| + α8(1-D
Euronext
)|CSADn,t| + εt                                                                        (7)                       
Given that the Euronext includes four markets, the equation is run three times for each market (to 
account for the effect of each of the other three markets‟ dynamics separately). Again here, all tests 
are performed for the December 31
st
, 1989 – October 31st, 2009 period.  
Financial crises have been shown to constitute turning points for herding in capital markets, with a 
series of studies (Choe et al., 1999; Hwang and Salmon, 2004) showing that the onset of a crisis leads 
to changes in herding. With the Euronext involving European markets and in view of the ongoing 
euro-zone sovereign debt crisis, we assess the presence of herding during the crisis (November 1
st
, 
2009 – December 31st, 2012) by estimating equations (4) and (6) for each market during that period.26
  
Our data was obtained from the Thomson-Reuters DataStream database and contains daily 
observations of closing prices, market capitalization and trading volume for all ordinary stocks listed 
on the Euronext‟s four equity markets commencing from December 31st, 1989 until December 31st, 
2012. Our study consists of 534 firms for Belgium, 2470 firms for France, 361 firms for the 
Netherlands and 270 firms for Portugal. In order to account for survivorship bias, we incorporate all 
active, dead and suspended stocks over the sample period. Panel A in Table 1 presents descriptive 
                                                          
26 In order to define the breakpoint i.e. the outbreak of the euro-zone debt crisis, we have performed a series of structural 
break tests. To begin with, we employed Bai and Perron‟s (2003) breakpoint test in equation (4) for the whole sample during 
the post-merger period (since April 2002). In this way, we endogenously identified October 2009 as a breakpoint; we 
confirmed this break point for each individual stock market using Chow‟s (1960) breakpoint test. Moreover, Hui and Chung 
(2011) and Ahmad et al. (2014) place the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis in late 2009 (October 2009), while 
Kalbaska and Gątkowski (2012) provide empirical findings based on which the crisis‟ start-point can be identified with 
November 2009. Therefore, in line with the structural breaks tests as well as the relevant literature we employ November 
2009 as the starting point of the euro-zone crisis for our analysis.  
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statistics for each market‟s CSAD and average daily returns, while Panel B contains the correlation 
matrices for our markets‟ average daily returns and CSADs. Overall, the correlations documented are 
high, with their lowest values reported for Portugal, the group‟s smallest (and as these figures 
indicate, least integrated) market. 
 
4. Results-discussion 
Tables 2-5 present the estimates (using Newey-West (1987) consistent estimators) and associated p-
values (in brackets) from the tests of equation (5) for each of our four sample markets and for each of 
the (domestic and international) market states outlined in the previous section for the 31/12/1989 – 
31/10/2009 period. As tables 2-4 illustrate, Belgium, France and the Netherlands present us with very 
little evidence of herding pre-merger, with α4 almost never assuming significantly negative values for 
any of these three markets
27
; conversely, all three markets accommodate significant herding post-
merger, as indicated by the consistently negative and significant (1 percent level) values of α3 across 
all tests. Portugal, on the other hand, appears to maintain a relatively consistent presence of herding 
both before and after its merger into the Euronext, with both α3 and α4 being significantly (10 percent 
level) negative for almost all tests (see table 5), indicating the presence of significant herding in that 
market throughout our sample period
28
. A closer inspection of the results from the Portuguese market 
reveals that for those tests where α3 and α4 are jointly significant and negative, the absolute value of α3 
is larger than that of α4 (with the single exception of the test for up CAC40 days), suggesting that the 
magnitude of herding has exhibited an increase in the Portuguese market post-merger. The difference 
between the α3 and α4 estimates is significant (10 percent level) in all cases for Belgium, France and 
the Netherlands, and in most cases for Portugal
29
. Overall, these results show that herding is 
significant in all four constituent equity markets (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal) of 
the Euronext post-merger only, with herding in Portugal being significant (yet less strong) pre-merger 
as well. A possible explanation for this, in line with Holmes et al. (2013), is that herding is promoted 
                                                          
27 The coefficient α4 is significantly (5 percent level) negative only during days of up CAC40-movements in Belgium and up 
domestic market days in France.  
28 Herding in Portugal is absent pre-merger during days of down S&P500-movements and up VIX-movements; and post-
merger during days of down domestic volume-movements.  
29 The exceptions in the case of Portugal arise for the tests performed for days of down domestic market-movements and up 
CAC40-movements. 
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in the Euronext as a result of the group‟s sophisticated structures that facilitate the observation 
(through the group‟s enhanced transparency) and imitation (rendered feasible through the group‟s 
enhanced liquidity) of the actions of informed investors by their uninformed counterparts.  
We also performed tests of the difference for each of α3 and α4 between each control variable‟s up 
versus down periods and reported their results in tables 2-5
30
. Regarding α4, it differs significantly 
between up and down periods of any single variable (all but one
31
 of the relevant test-statistics are 
significant at the 10 percent level), yet, as mentioned above, it presents us with limited evidence in 
favor of herding overall. With regards to α3 (which, as mentioned before, is almost always 
significantly negative), we observe that α3 is larger in absolute value during up 
domestic/CAC40/S&P500 days (as opposed to down ones) in almost all cases for all markets
32
, with 
the difference in α3 between up versus down domestic/CAC40/S&P500 days being statistically 
significant in most cases
33
. The presence of stronger herding during up-market days can be due to 
investors‟ optimism leading them to ride on upward trends. It is further possible that rising prices 
encourage the entry of unsophisticated investors in the market, in line with evidence from Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2001) and Lamont and Thaler (2003), thus rendering it more likely for herding to 
surface during up-market periods. The fact that this herding asymmetry is observed for both domestic 
and non-domestic (CAC40; S&P500) up-market days during the post-merger period is an indication 
that joining the Euronext has rendered these markets more sensitive to international market 
movements (more specifically, those of France - Euronext‟s lead market - and the US – the world‟s 
largest market). Furthermore, with the exception of Belgium, a3 presents us with higher absolute 
values during down-VIX days (as opposed to up-VIX ones), with the difference in α3 between up 
versus down VIX days being statistically insignificant in all cases. Given that VIX displays a negative 
relationship with S&P 500 returns (see for example Hibbert et al., 2008), down-VIX days are 
expected to have up-returns; consequently, this is in line with our previous finding on herding being 
stronger during up S&P500 days, driven either by optimism or by the increase of unsophisticated 
                                                          
30 What we are doing here is testing whether for each pair of tests related to a variable‟s two possible conditions (e.g. herding 
test for Belgium during up and during down volume days) the hypotheses a3,UP = a3,DOWN and a4,UP = a4,DOWN hold.  
31 This is the case of the test between up versus down VIX-days for France.  
32 The sole exception here is the up versus down days‟ pair for the CAC40 for the Portuguese market.  
33 This is not the case between up-down S&P500 days for France, the Netherlands and Portugal and up-down domestic 
market returns‟ days for Portugal.  
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investors‟ participation in the market. As far as up-/down-volume days are concerned, a3 is larger in 
absolute value during down-volume days in Belgium and the Netherlands (suggesting that herding 
there is motivated strongly by liquidity reasons
34
), with the opposite pattern being observed in France 
(indicative of herding being strongly motivated by informational reasons there
35
)
36
.              
We now turn to assess whether controlling for the dynamics of the group‟s other member-markets 
over each market‟s herding produces an effect over our herding estimates. Equation (7) is estimated 
for each market for all possible combinations of markets as described in the previous section and 
results are reported in table 6. Results presented are by and large similar to those reported in tables 2-
5, with herding being significant (1 percent level) in Belgium, France and the Netherlands
37
 post-
merger only; its significance (1 percent level) is documented both pre- and post-merger for Portugal, 
while the difference between the α3 and α4 estimates is significant at the 5 percent level for all four 
markets in all tests. The estimates for coefficients α7 and α8 are almost always significantly positive
38
, 
indicating that the cross-sectional dispersions of returns of all markets in our sample are significantly 
related to each other, in line with the high correlation coefficients among the CSADs presented in 
table 1, panel B. The values of α5 are significantly (10 percent level) negative for all markets
39
, 
whereas those of α6 are significantly (1 percent level) positive for all tests. These results suggest that 
the merger into the Euronext has led not only to the evolution of significant domestic herding in the 
group‟s markets, but also allowed for herding in each to be induced through the dynamics of the other 
member-markets, indicating that financial integration within the context of an exchange group can 
affect investors‟ behaviour in a market.       
Table 7 presents the results from equations (4) (panel A) and (6) (panel B) for the period following 
the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro-zone. Results from panel A suggest that Euronext-
                                                          
34 The difference in α3 between up versus down volume days is statistically significant (insignificant) for the Netherlands 
(Belgium). As mentioned in section 3, a reduced volume in the market leads investors to face more liquidity risk when 
trading (they may not be able to buy/sell stocks with lower volume when they wish to do so), leading their trades to cluster 
around those stocks with sufficient volume, with this concentration of their trades encouraging herding.    
35 The difference in α3 between up versus down volume days is statistically significant for France. Days with higher volume 
encourage the participation of informed investors, while also making it easier for uninformed investors to copy their trades 
(since higher volume reduces the possibility of thinness in trading, rendering herding feasible); see section 3 for more on 
this.  
36 Portugal is not mentioned here, as a3 is significantly positive – indicative of no herding – during down-volume days. 
37 Herding is absent post-merger in the Netherlands when controlling for the French market.  
38 The single exception here is detected in the Belgian market when controlling for Portugal.  
39 The exception here is Portugal, when controlling for the Belgian market.  
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markets exhibit no evidence of domestic herding during the crisis, as the coefficient α2 is insignificant 
in all cases. Controlling for the dynamics of the other member-markets confirms (panel B) the 
absence of domestic herding in all markets, yet we also notice that α3 assumes significantly negative 
values for Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal for several tests (this is the case for Belgium and 
Portugal when controlling for the dynamics of the French and the Dutch markets, and for the 
Netherlands when controlling for the dynamics of the French market). These results are notably 
interesting, as they suggest that the sovereign debt crisis promoted herding in the Euronext; however, 
this herding was not domestically motivated, but rather stemmed from the group‟s largest markets, 
France (for the rest three markets) and the Netherlands (for Belgium and Portugal).  A possible 
explanation for this is that the outbreak of the crisis led to the collapse of the pre-crisis consensus in 
the euro-zone (hence, the lack of “domestic” herding in all markets post-outbreak) by revealing 
groundbreaking macroeconomic fundamentals for several European nations. Amid such uncertainty, 
euro-zone‟s largest markets grew in importance as indicators of the investment community‟s 
increasing concerns over the ongoing crisis, affecting the decisions of investors in euro-zone‟s smaller 
markets and (considering the fact that all Euronext-markets are also members of the euro-zone) this is 
what our results reveal in terms of the specific investment pattern of herding for Euronext‟s markets.  
In summary, our findings show that herding is significant in all four constituent equity markets 
(Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal) of the Euronext post-merger only, with herding in 
Portugal being significant (yet less strong) pre-merger as well. These findings are robust when 
controlling for various domestic and international market states
40,41
, with results also indicating that 
                                                          
40 To account for the possibility that the time-difference between Europe and the US affects our estimates from the tests 
controlling for US variables (S&P500/VIX), we repeated all tests controlling for these variables, this time conditioning 
herding upon their lagged values; results overall confirm the patterns reported in tables 2-5. We also tested for the possibility 
of the size-effect in our findings by performing all unconditional herding tests (i.e. those whose estimates are presented in 
tables 2-5 under the title “total”) using value-weighted CSADs; results from these tests confirmed overall the findings 
presented in tables 2-5. Finally, as regards trading volume, we also employed  an alternative specification, conditioning 
herding upon whether volume is above or below its 30-day moving average value, in line with Economou et al. (2011), with 
results confirming those documented in tables 2-5 from estimations using up-down volume days. Results from the above 
tests are not reported here in the interest of brevity and are available upon request from the authors.    
41 Following an anonymous referee‟s suggestion, we also tested for herding in Germany (a euro-zone but not a Euronext 
member-market) before and after the Euronext‟s inception point (October 2000) in order to gauge whether our results are 
driven by the Euronext-merger or whether they are the product of the globalization process that leads to an overall reduction 
in the cost of trading worldwide. Our estimations showed that herding in Germany did not appear significant either before or 
after the Euronext‟s formation, while controlling for the effect of the German market‟s dynamics over the herding of each of 
the four Euronext-markets (based on equation (7) above) also revealed no change in the pattern of herding pre-/post-
Euronext for the four markets, thus denoting that the results reported in our paper are related to the Euronext-merger and are 
not due to the globalization process. Results are not presented here for brevity reasons and are available upon request.     
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herding post-merger grows stronger during days of positive performance of the domestic market, the 
Euronext‟s lead market (France) and the US market. The robustness of our results is further confirmed 
when accounting for the dynamics of the group‟s markets, while an interesting finding in this context 
is that herding in each market post-merger is not only domestically motivated but can also be induced 
via the dynamics of the group‟s other member-markets. The outbreak of the euro-zone sovereign debt 
crisis has given rise to significant herding in Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, with herding 
post-outbreak being, however, exclusively motivated by the dynamics of the group‟s two largest 
markets (France and the Netherlands).   
 
5. Conclusion 
The current study explores the effect of membership in cross-border exchange groups over herding 
dynamics in a group‟s member-markets and whether this effect persists when controlling for different 
domestic and international market states, the dynamics of the group‟s markets as well as the outbreak 
of financial crises. We investigate these issues in the context of the Euronext, one of the first-ever 
launched exchange groups, which encompasses four European equity markets (Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands and Portugal). Herding is significant in all four markets post-merger only, with herding in 
Portugal being significant (yet less strong) pre-merger as well. The robustness of these results is 
confirmed when controlling for various domestic and international market states, with herding 
appearing stronger during days of positive performance for the domestic market, Euronext‟s lead 
market (France) and the US market. Controlling for the dynamics of the group‟s markets further 
confirms the robustness of our results, with each market post-merger presenting us with significant 
herding motivated both domestically and by the dynamics of the rest three markets. The outbreak of 
the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis produces significant herding in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Portugal, with this herding, however, being not domestic but rather motivated by the dynamics of the 
group‟s two largest markets (France and the Netherlands).  
Our findings are of particular interest to the investment community and regulatory authorities in light 
of the ongoing global integration of capital markets. From an investor‟s perspective, the significance 
of herding post-merger in all four Euronext-markets coupled with the finding that much of it is due to 
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intra-Euronext dynamics (aside from each market‟s domestic ones) raises questions as to whether 
investing in markets that are integrated in common institutional settings (such as exchange groups) is 
beneficial in terms of portfolio diversification. As far as regulators are concerned, the fact that intra-
Euronext dynamics can promote herding in each member-market alongside the increased levels of 
herding during both domestic and international up-market days post-merger suggests that the 
integration of a capital market in an exchange group enhances the market‟s exposure to non-domestic 
factors. Given the increased frequency with which global financial episodes have affected capital 
markets during the past decades and the destabilizing potential of herding, these results suggest that 
such exposure can amplify investors‟ herding tendencies during global crises, thus increasing a 
market‟s systemic risk as well as the possibility of contagion within an exchange group. 
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Table 1: Statistical properties of the average returns and cross sectional absolute deviations of returns 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 rm,t CSADt 
 Belgium France Netherlands Portugal Belgium France Netherlands Portugal 
         
Mean 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0168 0.0157 0.0155 0.0140 
Median 0.0005 0.0007 0.0005 0.0006 0.0163 0.0146 0.0141 0.0127 
Standard Deviation 0.0083 0.0068 0.0090 0.0094 0.0072 0.0049 0.0065 0.0060 
Minimum -0.0658 -0.0578 -0.0955 -0.1115 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 0.0793 0.0498 0.0804 0.0877 0.0778 0.0567 0.0685 0.1069 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrices 
 
Belgium 
     rm,t 
France 
 rm,t 
Netherlands 
 rm,t 
Portugal  
rm,t 
 
 
Belgium 
CSADt 
France  
CSADt 
Netherlands 
CSADt 
Portugal 
CSADt 
          
Belgium rm,t 1.0000    Belgium CSADt 1.0000    
France rm,t 0.6976 1.0000   France CSADt 0.5910 1.0000   
Netherlands rm,t 0.6864 0.8279 1.0000  Netherlands CSADt 0.5617 0.7475 1.0000  
Portugal rm,t 0.4812 0.5902 0.5818 1.0000 Portugal CSADt 0.2641 0.3228 0.3306 1.0000 
 
Notes: Panel A presents statistics on the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for the daily observations of the cross-sectional absolute deviation 
of returns (CSAD) and average returns (rm,t) for each of Euronext‟s four constituent equity markets. rm,t is calculated by averaging all daily securities‟ returns each day, 
whereas the CSAD is calculated as 


N
i
tmtit
rr
n
CSAD
1
,,
1
, where ri,t is security‟s i return on day t, rm,t is the market‟s average return on day t (calculated by averaging all 
securities‟ returns on day t) and n is the total number of listed stocks. Panel B presents the pairwise correlation coefficients of the CSAD and rm,t for each of Euronext‟s four 
constituent equity markets. The sample window is December 31
st
, 1989 – December 31st, 2012. 
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Table 2:  Estimates of herding in Belgium  pre- versus post-merger in the Euronext 
Estimated 
parameters 
TOTAL DOMESTIC 
RETURN UP 
DOMESTIC 
RETURN 
DOWN 
CAC40 
UP 
CAC40 
DOWN 
S&P500 
UP 
S&P500 DOWN VIX UP VIX 
DOWN 
DOMESTIC 
VOLUME UP 
DOMESTIC 
VOLUME 
DOWN 
α0
 
0.0127 
(0.0000) 
0.0126 
(0.0000) 
0.01356 
(0.0000) 
0.0123 
(0.0000) 
0.01356 
(0.0000) 
0.0130 
(0.0000) 
0.01268 
(0.0000) 
0.0124 
(0.0000) 
0.0133 
(0.0000) 
0.0125 
(0.0000) 
0.0131 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
1.1166 
(0.0000) 
1.1967 
(0.0000) 
0.9894 
(0.0000) 
1.1884 
(0.0000) 
0.9851 
(0.0000) 
1.0786 
(0.0000) 
1.1081 
(0.0000) 
1.1172 
(0.0000) 
1.0587 
(0.0000) 
1.0518 
(0.0000) 
1.1578 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.3329 
(0.0000) 
0.4169 
(0.1440) 
-0.0405 
(0.4480) 
0.4627 
(0.0000) 
-0.1118 
(0.0300) 
0.0339 
(0.4970) 
0.4459 
(0.0000) 
0.4323 
(0.0000) 
-0.0045 
(0.9301) 
0.3035 
(0.0000) 
0.1447 
(0.0085) 
α3
 
-0.1070 
(0.0000) 
-0.1311 
(0.0000) 
-0.0807 
(0.0000) 
-0.1283 
(0.0000) 
-0.0799 
(0.0000) 
-0.1062 
(0.0000) 
-0.1004 
(0.0000) 
-0.1027 
(0.0000) 
-0.0998 
(0.0000) 
-0.0927 
(0.0000) 
-0.1108 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
0.0484 
(0.0000) 
-0.0074 
(0.5119) 
0.2436 
(0.0000) 
-0.0290 
(0.0105) 
0.2663 
(0.0000) 
0.1998 
(0.0000) 
-0.0096 
(0.4132) 
-0.0045 
(0.6993) 
0.2313 
(0.0000) 
0.0273 
(0.0173) 
0.2596 
(0.0000) 
t-stat1  
(H0:α1 = α2) 
-22.9468 
(0.0000) 
-15.8298 
(0.0000) 
-19.9006 
(0.0000) 
-14.5877 
(0.0000) 
-22.0163 
(0.0000) 
-20.9264 
(0.0000) 
-13.7440 
(0.0000) 
-14.4247 
(0.0000) 
-21.0284 
(0.0000) 
-16.5676 
(0.0000) 
-18.0925 
(0.0000) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
12.2919 
(0.0000) 
6.0042 
(0.0000) 
15.7639 
(0.0000) 
4.8194 
(0.0000) 
17.9021 
(0.0000) 
14.3228 
(0.0000) 
5.7156 
(0.0000) 
6.1411 
(0.0000) 
15.2073 
(0.0000) 
7.9881 
(0.0000) 
13.1616 
(0.0000) 
t-test 
(H0:α3,UP = α3,DOWN) 
 4.2341 
(0.0000) 
4.0941 
(0.0000) 
-15.9397 
(0.0000) 
0.1862 
(0.8523) 
-0.8130 
(0.4163) 
t-test 
(H0:α4,UP = α4,DOWN) 
 13.0282 
(0.0000) 
16.5024 
(0.0000) 
-17.7903 
(0.0000) 
12.6359 
(0.0000) 
10.4793 
(0.0000) 
R
2
 0.3976     0.3713 0.4578 0.3759 0.4658 0.4274 0.3916 0.3788 0.4472 0.3879 0.4591 
Notes: Table 2 presents the estimates from the following equation:  
CSADm,t = α0 + α1D
Euronext
|rm,t| + α2(1-D
Euronext
)|rm,t| + α3D
Euronext
r
2
m,t + α4(1-D
Euronext
) r
2
m,t + εt 
 
The equation is estimated for the 31/12/1989 - 31/10/2009 period both unconditionally (column headed “total”) and conditionally upon the daily movement (up/down) of the following variables: 
domestic market average return; domestic market trading volume; CAC40; S&P500; and the VIX. All estimates‟ p-values are reported in parentheses; the difference in significance between the 
pre- versus post-merger values of each coefficient is tested using t-test statistics; t-statistics are also used to test for the difference in significance for a3 and a4 between up and down states of 
each variable. rm,t refers to the Belgian market‟s average return; CSADm,t refers to the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns for the Belgian market. D
Euronext is a dummy equalling one 
following Belgium‟s merger into the Euronext (October 2000), zero otherwise.  
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Table 3:  Estimates of herding in France  pre- versus post-merger in the Euronext 
Estimated 
parameters 
TOTAL DOMESTIC 
RETURN UP 
DOMESTIC 
RETURN 
DOWN 
S&P500 UP S&P500 
DOWN 
VIX UP VIX DOWN DOMESTIC 
VOLUME 
UP 
DOMESTIC 
VOLUME 
DOWN 
α0
 
0.0129 
(0.0000) 
0.0125 
(0.0000) 
0.0132 
(0.0000) 
0.0127  
(0.0000) 
0.0133  
(0.0000) 
0.0129 
(0.0000) 
0.0129 
(0.0000) 
0.0127 
(0.0000) 
0.0131 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.9435 
(0.0000) 
1.0820 
(0.0000) 
0.8450 
(0.0000) 
0.9724  
(0.0000) 
0.8955  
(0.0000) 
0.9112 
(0.0000) 
0.9772 
(0.0000) 
0.9281 
(0.0000) 
0.9570 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.3859 
(0.0000) 
0.6181 
(0.0000) 
0.2085 
(0.0000) 
0.4599  
(0.0000) 
0.2343  
(0.0000) 
0.4031 
(0.0000) 
0.3880 
(0.2301) 
0.3315 
(0.0000) 
0.4538 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0.0938 
(0.0000) 
-0.1301 
(0.0000) 
-0.0699 
(0.0000) 
-0.0986  
(0.0000) 
-0.0840  
(0.0000) 
-0.0906 
(0.0000) 
-0.0927 
(0.0000) 
-0.0998 
(0.0000) 
-0.0490 
(0.0005) 
α4
 
0.0121 
(0.3063) 
-0.0811 
(0.0000) 
0.0696 
(0.0000) 
-0.0200  
(0.1645) 
0.0932  
(0.0000) 
0.0128 
(0.3561) 
0.0025 
(0.9991) 
0.0012 
(0.9379) 
0.0588 
(0.0024) 
t-stat1  
(H0:α1 = α2) 
-19.2150 
(0.0000) 
-11.1761 
(0.0000) 
-15.3054 
(0.0000) 
-13.0650  
(0.0000) 
-14.8196  
(0.0000) 
-13.3558 
(0.0000) 
-12.7413 
(0.0000) 
-14.7247 
(0.0000) 
-12.2731 
(0.0000) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
7.9949 
(0.0000) 
2.1096 
(0.0000) 
8.2169 
(0.0000) 
4.7021  
(0.0000) 
7.7248  
(0.0000) 
6.5144 
(0.0000) 
3.7990 
(0.0000) 
5.8418 
(0.0000) 
4.9473 
(0.0000) 
t-test 
(H0:α3,UP = α3,DOWN) 
 5.6698 
(0.0000) 
1.1618 
(0.2454) 
-0.1447 
(0.8849) 
3.6330 
(0.0003) 
t-test 
(H0:α4,UP = α4,DOWN) 
 9.9450 
(0.0000) 
5.1806 
(0.0000) 
-0.5595 
(0.5758) 
2.9814 
(0.0029) 
R
2
 0.4240       0.3956 0.4663 0.4032 0.4529 0.4451 0.4069 0.4119 0.4862 
Notes: Table 3 presents the estimates from the following equation:  
CSADm,t = α0 + α1D
Euronext
|rm,t| + α2(1-D
Euronext
)|rm,t| + α3D
Euronext
r
2
m,t + α4(1-D
Euronext
) r
2
m,t + εt 
 
The equation is estimated for the 31/12/1989 - 31/10/2009 period both unconditionally (column headed “total”) and conditionally upon the daily movement (up/down) of the following variables: 
domestic market average return; domestic market trading volume; S&P500; and the VIX. All estimates‟ p-values are reported in parentheses; the difference in significance between the pre- 
versus post-merger values of each coefficient is tested using t-test statistics; t-statistics are also used to test for the difference in significance for a3 and a4 between up and down states of each 
variable. rm,t refers to the French market‟s average return; CSADm,t refers to the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns for the French market. D
Euronext is a dummy equalling one following 
France‟s merger into the Euronext (October 2000), zero otherwise.  
 
 
 
Page 30 of 33
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
28 
 
Table 4:  Estimates of herding in the Netherlands  pre- versus post-merger in the Euronext 
Estimated 
parameters 
TOTAL DOMESTIC 
RETURN UP 
DOMESTIC 
RETURN 
DOWN 
CAC40 UP CAC40 
DOWN 
S&P500 
UP 
S&P500 
DOWN 
VIX UP VIX 
DOWN 
DOMESTIC 
VOLUME UP 
DOMESTIC 
VOLUME 
DOWN 
α0
 
0.0113 
(0.0000) 
0.0110 
(0.0000) 
0.0115 
(0.0000) 
0.0109 
(0.0000) 
0.0116 
(0.0000) 
0.0111 
(0.0000) 
0.0116 
(0.0000) 
0.0114 
(0.0000) 
0.0112 
(0.0000) 
0.0113 
(0.0000) 
0.0112 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.9454 
(0.0000) 
1.0707 
(0.0000) 
0.8474 
(0.0000) 
1.0609 
(0.0000) 
0.8554 
(0.0000) 
0.9880 
(0.0000) 
0.9016 
(0.0000) 
0.8932 
(0.0000) 
1.0011 
(0.0000) 
0.8692 
(0.0000) 
1.0582 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.3956 
(0.1304) 
0.5541 
(0.0000) 
0.2764 
(0.0000) 
0.5531 
(0.0000) 
0.2813 
(0.0000) 
0.4072 
(0.0000) 
0.3902 
(0.4928) 
0.3466 
(0.0000) 
0.4539 
(0.0000) 
0.4185 
(0.0000) 
0.3431 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0.0683 
(0.0000) 
-0.0738 
(0.0000) 
-0.0582 
(0.0000) 
-0.0727 
(0.0000) 
-0.0594 
(0.0000) 
-0.0706 
(0.0000) 
-0.0642 
(0.0000) 
-0.0637 
(0.0000) 
-0.0691 
(0.0000) 
-0.0593 
(0.0000) 
-0.0758 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
0.0396 
(0.0036) 
-0.0219 
(0.3594) 
0.0784 
(0.0000) 
-0.0338 
(0.1239) 
0.0841 
(0.0000) 
0.5728 
(0.0017) 
0.0201 
(0.3221) 
0.0629 
(0.0008) 
0.0119 
(0.5501) 
0.0049 
(0.7699) 
0.1323 
(0.0000) 
t-stat1  
(H0:α1 = α2) 
-17.3989 
(0.0000) 
-11.1736 
(0.0000) 
-13.1195 
(0.0000) 
-11.2861 
(0.0000) 
-12.9019 
(0.0000) 
-13.5611 
(0.0000) 
-10.8598 
(0.0000) 
-12.4939 
(0.0000) 
-11.9495 
(0.0000) 
-10.9390 
(0.0000) 
-14.5976 
(0.0000) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
7.9562 
(0.0000) 
2.1644 
(0.0305) 
8.0603 
(0.0000) 
1.7673 
(0.0773) 
8.1021 
(0.0000) 
6.8807 
(0.0000) 
4.1892 
(0.0000) 
6.8407 
(0.0000) 
4.0320 
(0.0000) 
3.8359 
(0.0001) 
8.7842 
(0.0000) 
t-test 
(H0:α3,UP = α3,DOWN) 
 2.7373 
(0.0062) 
2.2781 
(0.0228) 
1.0639 
(0.2875) 
-0.6384 
(0.5233) 
-1.9510 
(0.0512) 
t-test 
(H0:α4,UP = α4,DOWN) 
 5.9041 
(0.0000) 
6.6345 
(0.0000) 
-1.8254 
(0.0681) 
-2.5707 
(0.0102) 
5.3976 
(0.0000) 
R
2
 0.5002    0.4812 0.5369 0.4983 0.5141 0.4985 0.5035 0.5102 0.4943 0.5035 0.5153 
Notes: Table 4 presents the estimates from the following equation:  
CSADm,t = α0 + α1D
Euronext
|rm,t| + α2(1-D
Euronext
)|rm,t| + α3D
Euronext
r
2
m,t + α4(1-D
Euronext
) r
2
m,t + εt 
 
The equation is estimated for the 31/12/1989 - 31/10/2009 period both unconditionally (column headed “total”) and conditionally upon the daily movement (up/down) of the following variables: 
domestic market average return; domestic market trading volume; CAC40; S&P500; and the VIX. All estimates‟ p-values are reported in parentheses; the difference in significance between the 
pre- versus post-merger values of each coefficient is tested using t-test statistics; t-statistics are also used to test for the difference in significance for a3 and a4 between up and down states of 
each variable. rm,t refers to the Dutch market‟s average return; CSADm,t refers to the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns for the Dutch market. D
Euronext is a dummy equalling one 
following Netherlands‟s merger into the Euronext (October 2000), zero otherwise.  
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Table 5:  Estimates of herding in Portugal  pre versus post-merger in the Euronext 
Estimated 
parameters 
TOTAL DOMESTIC 
RETURN UP 
DOMESTIC 
RETURN 
DOWN 
CAC40 UP CAC40 
DOWN 
S&P500 
UP 
S&P500 
DOWN 
VIX UP VIX DOWN DOMESTIC 
VOLUME 
UP 
DOMESTIC 
VOLUME 
DOWN 
α0
 
0.0097 
(0.0000) 
0.0096 
(0.0000) 
0.0098 
(0.0000) 
0.0097 
(0.0000) 
0.0098 
(0.0000) 
0.0097 
(0.0000) 
0.0101 
(0.0000) 
0.0102 
(0.0000) 
0.0096 
(0.0000) 
0.0097 
(0.0000) 
0.0101 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.6302 
(0.0000) 
0.6718 
(0.0000) 
0.5909 
(0.0000) 
0.6455 
(0.0000) 
0.6042 
(0.0000) 
0.6195 
(0.0000) 
0.5825 
(0.0000) 
0.5686 
(0.0000) 
0.6439 
(0.0000) 
0.6559 
(0.0000) 
0.5453 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.7301 
(0.0000) 
0.8029 
(0.0000) 
0.6313 
(0.0000) 
0.6797 
(0.0000) 
0.7176 
(0.0000) 
0.7163 
(0.0000) 
0.5158 
(0.0000) 
0.5411 
(0.0000) 
0.7450 
(0.0000) 
0.7216 
(0.0000) 
0.4950 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0.0488 
(0.0000) 
-0.0495 
(0.0000) 
-0.0408 
(0.0000) 
-0.0117 
(0.0741) 
-0.0617 
(0.0000) 
-0.0665 
(0.0000) 
-0.0291 
(0.0028) 
-0.0292 
(0.0003) 
-0.0662 
(0.0000) 
-0.0627 
(0.0000) 
0.0845 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
-0.0323 
(0.0000) 
-0.0266 
(0.0002) 
-0.0342 
(0.0000) 
-0.0227 
(0.0015) 
-0.0373 
(0.0000) 
-0.0281 
(0.0000) 
0.0576 
(0.0000) 
0.0303 
(0.0000) 
-0.0274 
(0.0000) 
-0.0418 
(0.0000) 
-0.0146 
(0.0241) 
t-stat1  
(H0:α1 = α2) 
-4.6264 
(0.0000) 
4.4019 
(0.0000) 
1.2656 
(0.2058) 
1.1138 
(0.2655) 
3.7176 
(0.0002) 
3.4952 
(0.0005) 
-1.9011 
(0.0574) 
-0.8291 
(0.4071) 
3.5205 
(0.0004) 
2.1243 
(0.0337) 
-1.6516 
(0.0987) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
-2.8030 
(0.0051) 
-2.4816 
(0.0131) 
-0.7970 
(0.4255) 
1.2356 
(0.2167) 
-3.0262 
(0.0025) 
-5.7349 
(0.0000) 
7.4781 
(0.0000) 
5.8086 
(0.0000) 
-5.3561 
(0.0000) 
-2.5198 
(0.0118) 
9.8026 
(0.0000) 
t-test 
(H0:α3,UP = α3,DOWN) 
 -0.9920 
(0.3213) 
-1.9491 
(0.0514) 
-0.1078 
(0.9142) 
0.2625 
(0.7929) 
4.1881 
(0.0000) 
t-test 
(H0:α4,UP = α4,DOWN) 
 1.9742 
(0.0485) 
-11.4535 
(0.0000) 
14.8801 
(0.0000) 
-23.8966 
(0.0000) 
16.7722 
(0.0000) 
R
2
 0.4125      0.4417 0.3914 0.4499 0.3922 0.3849 0.4981 0.4564 0.3993 0.4037 0.4900 
Notes: Table 5 presents the estimates from the following equation:  
CSADm,t = α0 + α1D
Euronext
|rm,t| + α2(1-D
Euronext
)|rm,t| + α3D
Euronext
r
2
m,t + α4(1-D
Euronext
) r
2
m,t + εt 
 
The equation is estimated for the 31/12/1989 - 31/10/2009 period both unconditionally (column headed “total”) and conditionally upon the daily movement (up/down) of the following variables: 
domestic market average return; domestic market trading volume; CAC40; S&P500; and the VIX. All estimates‟ p-values are reported in parentheses; the difference in significance between the 
pre- versus post-merger values of each coefficient is tested using t-test statistics; t-statistics are also used to test for the difference in significance for a3 and a4 between up and down states of 
each variable. rm,t refers to the Portuguese market‟s average return; CSADm,t refers to the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns for the Portuguese market. D
Euronext is a dummy equalling 
one following Portugal‟s merger into the Euronext (April 2002), zero otherwise.  
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Table 6:  Estimates of herding in Euronext’s four markets controlling for the dynamics of the group’s markets  pre- versus post-merger in the Euronext 
Market for which 
herding is estimated→ 
BELGIUM  FRANCE  NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL 
Estimated 
parameters
↓ 
Control 
markets 
→ 
France  Netherlands  Portugal  Belgium  Netherlands  Portugal  Belgium  France  Portugal  Belgium  France  Netherlands  
α0
 
0.0092 
(0.0000) 
0.0116 
(0.0000) 
0.0118 
(0.0000) 
0.0117 
(0.0000) 
0.0113 
(0.0000) 
0.0124 
(0.0000) 
0.0097 
(0.0000) 
0.0073 
(0.0000) 
0.0108 
(0.0000) 
0.0091 
(0.0000) 
0.0083 
(0.0000) 
0.0089 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.7422 
(0.0000) 
0.8602 
(0.0000) 
0.9309 
(0.0000) 
0.7265 
(0.0000) 
0.5901 
(0.0000) 
0.8068 
(0.0000) 
0.7268 
(0.0000) 
0.4022 
(0.0000) 
0.8036 
(0.0000) 
0.5018 
(0.0000) 
0.5500 
(0.0000) 
0.5825 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.3299 
(0.0000) 
-0.0450 
(0.2388) 
0.4940 
(0.0000) 
0.5421 
(0.0000) 
0.3447 
(0.0000) 
0.4575 
(0.0000) 
0.5239 
(0.0000) 
0.3799 
(0.0000) 
0.4439 
(0.0000) 
0.7554 
(0.4903) 
0.6944 
(0.0000) 
0.7018 
(0.0885) 
α3
 
-0.0406 
(0.0004) 
-0.0717 
(0.0000) 
-0.0985 
(0.0000) 
-0.0426 
(0.0000) 
-0.0292 
(0.0002) 
-0.0661 
(0.0000) 
-0.0411 
(0.0000) 
0.0048 
(0.2827) 
-0.0481 
(0.0000) 
-0.0552 
(0.0000) 
-0.0444 
(0.0000) 
-0.0487 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
0.0552 
(0.0000) 
0.2460 
(0.0000) 
0.0330 
(0.0004) 
-0.0147 
(0.1676) 
0.0284 
(0.0086) 
0.0282 
(0.0159) 
0.0722 
(0.0000) 
0.0717 
(0.0000) 
0.0507 
(0.0006) 
-0.0226 
(0.0000) 
-0.0217 
(0.0000) 
-0.0249 
(0.0000) 
α5
 
-0.1314 
(0.0000) 
-0.0245 
(0.0000) 
-0.0129 
(0.0144) 
-0.0425 
(0.0000) 
-0.0329 
(0.0000) 
-0.0179 
(0.0000) 
-0.0594 
(0.0000) 
-0.1683 
(0.0000) 
-0.0294 
(0.0000) 
-0.0037 
(0.5329) 
-0.0311 
(0.0004) 
-0.0076 
(0.0556) 
α6
 
0.0712 
(0.0000) 
0.0903 
(0.0000) 
0.0042 
(0.2138) 
0.0634 
(0.0000) 
0.0816 
(0.0000) 
0.0137 
(0.0000) 
0.1243 
(0.0000) 
0.1102 
(0.0000) 
0.0025 
(0.0000) 
0.0186 
(0.0002) 
0.0688 
(0.00000 
0.0434 
(0.0000) 
α7
 
0.1880 
(0.0000) 
0.0758 
(0.0000) 
0.1165 
(0.0000) 
0.0621 
(0.0000) 
0.0940 
(0.0000) 
0.0656 
(0.0000) 
0.0871 
(0.0000) 
0.2584 
(0.0000) 
0.0883 
(0.0000) 
0.0358 
(0.0000) 
0.0642 
(0.0000) 
0.0290 
(0.0000) 
α8
 
0.1559 
(0.0000) 
0.1164 
(0.0000) 
0.0058 
(0.1043) 
0.0433 
(0.0000) 
0.1202 
(0.0000) 
0.0162 
(0.0000) 
0.0545 
(0.0000) 
0.1745 
(0.0000) 
0.0085 
(0.0047) 
0.0168 
(0.0000) 
0.0704 
(0.0000) 
0.0491 
(0.0000) 
t-stat1  
(H0:α1 = α2) 
-9.1812 
(0.0000) 
-20.6310 
(0.0000) 
-11.3735 
(0.0000) 
-5.6692 
(0.0000) 
-8.1803 
(0.0000) 
-10.8564 
(0.0000) 
-5.5384 
(0.0000) 
-0.6630 
(0.5073) 
-9.9073 
(0.0000) 
8.8811 
(0.0000) 
4.7507 
(0.0000) 
4.3731 
(0.0000) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
6.6619 
(0.0000) 
19.2371 
(0.0000) 
10.0452 
(0.0000) 
2.0809 
(0.0375) 
4.3172 
(0.0000) 
6.8372 
(0.0000) 
7.6385 
(0.0000) 
4.8142 
(0.0000) 
6.5444 
(0.0000) 
-4.2483 
(0.0000) 
-2.4789 
(0.0132) 
-2.3479 
(0.0189) 
t-stat3 
(H0:α5 = α6) 
3.9773 
(0.0001) 
-5.2448 
(0.0000) 
1.3912 
(0.1642) 
-3.0882 
(0.0020) 
-5.6577 
(0.0000) 
0.9651 
(0.3345) 
-5.8740 
(0.0000) 
4.7286 
(0.0000) 
4.5982 
(0.0000) 
-1.9200 
(0.0549) 
-3.2931 
(0.0010) 
-4.0334 
(0.0000) 
t-stat4 
(H0:α7 = α8) 
4.0031 
(0.0000) 
5.4624 
(0.0000) 
-15.5966 
(0.0000) 
-5.8598 
(0.0000) 
6.0216 
(0.0000) 
-10.5249 
(0.0000) 
7.1702 
(0.0762) 
-14.9502 
(0.0000) 
174.5251 
(0.0025) 
-4.6189 
(0.0000) 
1.0146 
(0.3103) 
3.8991 
(0.0001) 
R2 0.5153       0.5052 0.4607 0.5446 0.6425 0.5010 0.5839 0.7374 0.5348 0.4285 0.4454 0.4349 
Notes: Table 6 presents the estimates from the following equation:  
CSADm,t = α0 + α1D
Euronext|rm,t| + α2(1-D
Euronext)|rm,t| + α3D
Euronextr2m,t + α4(1-D
Euronext) r2m,t + α5D
Euronextr2n,t + α6(1-D
Euronext) r2n,t + α7D
Euronext|CSADn,t| + α8(1-D
Euronext)|CSADn,t| + εt  
 
The equation is estimated for the 31/12/1989 - 31/10/2009 period for each Euronext-market and all estimates‟ p-values are reported in parentheses. The difference in significance between the 
pre- versus post-merger values of each coefficient is tested using t-test statistics. rm,t and CSADm,t refer to the average return and the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns for the market 
for which herding is estimated each time.  rn,t and CSADn,t refer to the average return and the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns for the control market used for each test. D
Euronext is a 
dummy equalling one following the merger of each market for which herding is estimated into the Euronext, zero otherwise. 
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Table 7: Estimates of herding in Euronext’s four markets following the outbreak of the euro-zone’s sovereign debt crisis 
Panel A: Herding estimates without controlling for the other member-markets‟ effect 
 Belgium France Netherlands Portugal 
α0 
 
0.0151 
(0.0000) 
0.0130 
(0.0000) 
0.0145 
(0.0000) 
0.0134 
(0.0000) 
α1 
 
0.4754 
(0.0000) 
0.4610 
(0.0000) 
0.4386 
(0.0000) 
0.4720 
(0.0000) 
α2 
 
-1.3306 
(0.5276) 
-0.4110 
(0.6751) 
-1.6311 
(0.2390) 
-1.8232 
(0.1178) 
R2 0.2897 0.6213 0.3481 0.2236 
Panel B: Herding estimates controlling for the effect of the other member-markets 
Market for which herding is 
estimated→
 
Belgium France Netherlands Portugal 
Estimated 
parameters↓ 
Control markets 
→ 
France  Netherlands Portugal Belgium Netherlands Portugal Belgium France Portugal Belgium France Netherlands 
α0 
 
0.0128 
(0.0000) 
0.0147 
(0.0000) 
0.0152 
(0.0000) 
0.0122 
(0.0000) 
0.0118 
(0.0000) 
0.0127 
(0.0000) 
0.0137 
(0.0000) 
0.0103 
(0.0000) 
0.0137 
(0.0000) 
0.0136 
(0.0000) 
0.0107 
(0.0000) 
0.0114 
(0.0000) 
α1 
 
0.3880 
(0.0000) 
0.4576 
(0.0000) 
0.4977 
(0.0000) 
0.4471 
(0.0000) 
0.3715 
(0.0000) 
0.4465 
(0.0000) 
0.4381 
(0.0000) 
0.3509 
(0.0000) 
0.4248 
(0.0000) 
0.4670 
(0.0000) 
0.4341 
(0.0000) 
0.4467 
(0.0000) 
α2 
 
0.0399 
(0.1426) 
0.0037 
(0.8762) 
-0.0276 
(0.2165) 
-0.0060 
(0.5916) 
-0.0089 
(0.3901) 
-0.0050 
(0.6143) 
-0.0171 
(0.2750) 
-0.0310 
(0.1806) 
-0.0185 
(0.1858) 
-0.0227 
(0.1572) 
-0.0180 
(0.1227) 
-0.0183 
(0.1122) 
α3 
 
-0.1065 
(0.0000) 
-0.0186 
(0.0479) 
0.0095 
(0.0431) 
-0.0050 
(0.5076) 
0.0045 
(0.4003) 
0.0007 
(0.7501) 
-0.0114 
(0.4071) 
-0.0694 
(0.0002) 
-0.0033 
(0.4490) 
0.0341 
(0.0549) 
-0.0542 
(0.0185) 
-0.0199 
(0.0915) 
α4 
 
0.1244 
(0.0000) 
0.0196 
(0.0331) 
-0.0073 
(0.1528) 
0.0262 
(0.0000) 
0.0464 
(0.0000) 
0.0101 
(0.0000) 
0.0242 
(0.0034) 
0.2190 
(0.0000) 
0.0254 
(0.0000) 
-0.0079 
(0.5486) 
0.1372 
(0.0000) 
0.0752 
(0.0000) 
R2 0.3281 0.2949 0.2939 0.6438 0.6834 0.6314 0.3552 0.4435 0.3711 0.2273 0.2436 0.2525 
Notes: Table 7 presents the estimates from the following equations:  
Panel A: CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r
2
m,t + εt   
Panel B: CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r
2
m,t + α3r
2
n,t + α4CSADn,t + εt   
The equation is estimated for the 1/11/2009 - 31/12/2012 period for each Euronext-market and all estimates‟ p-values are reported in parentheses. rm,t and CSADm,t refer to the average return 
and the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns for the market for which herding is estimated each time.  rn,t and CSADn,t in panel B refer to the average return and the cross-sectional 
absolute deviation of returns for the control market used for each test.  
 
